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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was entered on July 29, 2004, 
and is attached hereto in the addendum. Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
confers sole jurisdiction upon this Court to review decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Initially, the Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by 
an order dated October 4, 2002. (R. at 474.) Prior to the transfer, Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) conferred jurisdiction on this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the reservation of the easement in this case was sufficiently 
specific to be enforceable, and whether the easement may be deemed a floating or 
roving easement. 
Standard of Review: Whether an easement exists is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. "However, the existence of an easement is also a highly 
fact-dependent question; therefore, we accord the trial judge a measure of 
discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the facts, and overturn a 
ruling concerning the existence of an easement only if the judge exceeded the 
discretion granted." Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, II1, 37 P.3d 1112. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or other rules 
1 
controlling the issue presented in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a dispute involving a reservation included in a 
quitclaim deed between a landowner and Utah County ("County"). The R.L. Bird 
Company ("Bird") owned property in Utah County within and to the south and 
east of a recorded subdivision known as the Ironton Plat. (R. at 277, 279, 330, 
339, 343-44, 415-16, 420-21; Addendum at A47.) When Bird quitclaimed 
property to the County within the Ironton Plat, plus a 120-foot-by-760-foot strip 
("Strip") immediately to the south1, it included the following language in the deed: 
RESERVING to the grantor [(Bird)] the public use and right-of-way 
over and into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide 
right-of-way over and across the last described parcel of land [(the 
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with the grantor's remaining 
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road 
within 90 days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to 
grantor's remaining land. 
(R. at 214, 216, 218, 241, 256-57, 278-79, 342-43, 420-21; Addendum at A46.) 
At the time, the Ironton Plat was bounded by Pine Street on the south and 
Highway 89 (the "State Highway" mentioned in the reservation) on the west. (R. 
1
 These dimensions equate to 91,200 square feet, or 2.09 acres. 
2 
at 218, 279, 420-21; Addendum at A472.) Pine Street, however, existed only on 
the plat map. It had neither been opened nor used since its dedication over sixty 
years before. (R. at 218, 238-39, 275, 277-78, 341-42, 417-20, 476/45 & /46.) 
The County never built the road mentioned in the reservation, but instead 
constructed public works buildings and a parking lot in the Ironton Plat over the 
locations of Pine Street and other dedicated but unopened streets within the 
subdivision. During construction, approximately two-thirds of the western portion 
of Pine Street was excavated to flatten the slope of the area. (R. at 208, 277, 310-
12, 476/10-/12; Addendum at A48-A50.) No evidence has been presented that 
Bird, which had access to its remaining property off of Highway 89 further south, 
ever sought enjoin the County from excavating the Pine Street area or to build the 
road mentioned in the reservation. (R. at 390, 476/11-/12, 476/62.) 
Later, Bird sold its remaining property to plaintiff/appellee Jamie Evans, 
subsequently conveying the reserved easement via a corrective deed. (R. at 228-
29, 274, 277, 298-300, 336, 339,410-11,415-16.) 
After the County vacated certain platted but unimproved roads within the 
Ironton Plat not at issue here, Evans sued, seeking, inter alia, a declaration 
2
 The map included in the Addendum illustrates the properties and boundaries at 
issue: Pine Street is highlighted in blue, the Strip in green, Highway 89 appears as 
a pair of dashed lines, and Bird's remaining property is filled with red diagonal 
lines. (Addendum at A47.) 
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validating the reserved easement. (R. at 13-14, 275-76, 279-80, 337-39, 411-15, 
422-23.) 
The Course of Proceedings 
On the County's motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed 
Evans's suit. The court held that Evans's reservation failed for several reasons, 
one of which is presented here for the Court's consideration: The district court 
ruled that the reservation language was impermissibly vague because it failed to 
identify the location and boundaries of the easement. (Addendum at A27-A28, 
A42-A43.) 
Evans appealed, and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the 
case to the district court to develop the record to determine whether Evans had a 
right to reserve (or except) an easement over Pine Street. See Evans v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs, 2004 UT App 256, 1125-27, 97 P.3d 697. This Court then 
granted the County's petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue presented here. 
Should the Court reverse the court of appeals's holding on this issue, remand will 
be unnecessary. 
Disposition Below 
On the issue presented to this Court for review, the court of appeals held 
Although the reservation was originally Bird's, because Evans now owns it (if it 
exists), the County herein refers to it as "Evans's reservation" or "Evans's 
easement." 
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that Evans's reservation was "sufficiently detailed to create an enforceable 
easement." Id. at ^14. According to the court of appeals, the "clear and detailed 
language" of Evans's easement identifying its purpose and the servient and 
dominant estates was sufficient. Id. at \\5. The court also characterized the 
easement as floating or roving, and held that the trial court could fix its location 
using any of the factors listed in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc. 
("Walker"), 253 R2d 365 (Utah 1953). See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, <H16-22, 97 
P.3d 697. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL 
1. The R.L. Bird Company owned property in Utah County within and to the 
south and east of a subdivision known as the Ironton Plat, recorded in 1926. (R. at 
277, 279, 330, 339, 343-44,415-16, 420-21; Addendum at A47.) 
2. In 1983, Bird conveyed to the County by quitclaim deed property within the 
Ironton Plat, as well as the Strip. The deed contained the following language: 
RESERVING to the grantor [(Bird)] the public use and right-of-way 
over and into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide 
right-of-way over and across the last described parcel of land [(the 
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with the grantor's remaining 
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road 
within 90 days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to 
grantor's remaining land. 
(R. at 214, 216, 218, 241, 256-57, 278-79, 342-43,420-21; Addendum at A46.) 
3. Bird later sold its remaining property to Evans, including the easement. (R. 
5 
at 228-29, 274, 277, 298-300, 336, 339, 410-11, 415-16.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah courts interpret reservations of easements using contract law 
principles. Essential terms include the easement's boundaries and location. 
Because Evans's easement fails to sufficiently specify its boundaries and location, 
it is void. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied these standards in Potter v. 
Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, a substantially similar case, to find the 
reservation at issue there void. Its decision below represents an unwarranted 
departure from that precedent. 
Consistent with these same principles of construction, parties' failure to 
sufficiently specify an easement's boundaries or location does not transform an 
otherwise invalid easement into a valid floating or roving easement. Roating or 
roving easements, rather, are a special category of easements that define their 
unpredictable boundaries and locations using methods specified by the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BIRD'S RESERVED EASEMENT IS VOID BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFY ITS BOUNDARIES OR LOCATION. 
Evan's reservation consists of two parts: (1) a right of way from the 
highway into Pine Street, and (2) a fifty-six-foot-wide right of way crossing the 
Strip from Pine Street to Bird's remaining property. (Stmt, of Facts f2.) This 
6 
latter portion of the reservation fails to sufficiently specify the easement's 
boundaries or location, rendering it void.4 
The court of appeals found, and the County does not disagree, that the 
reservation adequately identifies its purpose, the dominant and servient estates, 
and "Bird's intent to reserve an easement." Evans v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 
2004 UT App 256,110, 97 P.3d 697. The reservation also clearly states that the 
easement is fifty-six feet wide. But neither do the parties dispute that the 
reservation fails to specify the easement's length or its location over the 91,200 
square feet of the Strip. The absence of these latter, essential terms nullifies the 
easement. 
Upon considering a situation almost identical to that presented here, the 
court of appeals panel deciding Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, 
concluded that the reservation at issue in that case was void. There, an easement 
was reserved in a special warranty deed through which Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
conveyed 1.58 acres to Villatek, Inc. See id. at fI2-3. The deed stated that the 
4
 The court of appeals noted that, "because Bird may have acquired its property 
interest [in Pine Street] with reference to the plat map," the first part of the 
easement may be more properly characterized as an exception, rather than a 
reservation. Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 110 n.3, 97 P.3d 697. This technical 
distinction, however, has lost most of its substantive meaning. See Hartman v. 
Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) ("[S]ince the terms are often used 
interchangeably, the distinction has been disregarded to a great extent ...."). For 
that reason, and because the County's argument focuses on the second part of the 
easement (which is properly characterized as a reservation), the County herein 
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conveyance was "'Subject To A Right-Of-Way Over The East 66 Feet Of Said 
Property, For The Purpose Of A Proposed Road.'" Id. at [^10 (quoting the special 
warranty deed). Through a series of subsequent transfers, the Potters ended up 
owning a portion of the 1.58 acres. Years later, and after the Potters had built 
improvements on the never-used strip without objection, Chadaz, who claimed the 
reservation was for her benefit, asserted the easement over the property. The 
Potters then sued to quiet title and prevailed on a motion for summary judgment. 
Seeid.tiL<i5. 
Relying extensively on its prior decision in Warburton, the court of appeals 
observed that "'[wjords that clearly show intention to grant an easement are 
sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term/" Id. at %9 
(quoting Warburton, 899 P.2d at 782) (secondary internal quote omitted). In 
upholding the trial court's decision, the court of appeals determined that the 
reservation "fail[edl to meet the requirements of an express easement." Id. at %l 1. 
While the court found that the parties intended to create an express easement, it 
held that their failure to specify the easement's boundaries and exact location 
rendered it unenforceable: 
Although it appears the parties intended to create an express easement, 
the language in the deed is not sufficiently detailed. In fact, it does not 
specify the boundaries of the easement or its exact location. This vague 
refers to the easement language as a reservation. 
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language does not constitute a definite and ascertainable description of 
the property. 
A/, at 111. 
The court of appeals acknowledged Potter's factual similarity to the present 
case. See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 114, 97 P.3d 697 ("Admittedly, there are 
factual similarities between Potter and the instant case."). As in Potter, neither the 
grantor, grantee, nor the interest granted are in doubt here. The easement asserted 
in the present case, like the one at issue in Potter, has never been used. (R. at 218, 
238-29, 275, 277-78, 341-42, 417-20, 476/45 & /46.) And, as in Potter, the 
County has developed over most of the possible locations for Evans's easement 
(removing a significant amount of soil from the platted, yet unimproved Pine 
Street) without objection. (R. at 208, 277, 310-12, 390, 476/10-/12, 476/62; 
Addendum at A48-A50.) Most importantly, the easement in Potter was described 
as a road right of way over the east sixty-six feet of the conveyed property. See 
Potter, 1999 UT App 95,110, 977 P.2d 533. Similarly, the second part of Evans's 
easement is a road right of way traversing the conveyed Strip. (Stmt, of Facts f2.) 
Indeed, the reservation in Potter actually was more specific than Evans's. The 
Potter reservation somewhat specified where on the property the easement was 
located: the east sixty-six feet. In contrast, Evans's reservation merely defines the 
width of the right of way as fifty-six feet. It provides no direction as to where it 
should be located over the 760-foot length of the two-acre Strip. 
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Despite the instant case's favorable factual comparison to Potter, the court 
of appeals nevertheless concluded "that the deed language in this case is 
sufficiently detailed to create an enforceable easement." Evans, 2004 UT App 
256, 114, 97 P.3d 697. Based principally upon extrajurisdictional case law, some 
of it unpublished, the court held that Evans's reservation needed only to identify 
the easement's dominant and servient estates and its purpose. See id. at H9-15. 
Thus, under the court of appeals's interpretation, easements that fail to identify 
their boundaries or location may still be valid if these other three elements are 
sufficiently identified. However, an analysis of the applicable rules of 
construction reveals the court's resort to extrajurisdictional decisions to formulate 
this standard is unwarranted. 
"Interpretation of easements and restrictive covenants follows the same 
rules of construction used in interpreting contracts." Canyon Meadows Home 
Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414,17, 40 P.3d 1148. Cf. Ault v. 
Holden, 2002 UT 33, 137, 44 P.3d 781 ("Deeds are construed like other written 
legal instruments."). "The underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a 
contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract." WebBank v. 
American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,117, 54 P.3d 1139. To ascertain 
the parties' intentions, Utah courts look to the contract's plain language. "'If the 
language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the parties" 
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intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and 
the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.'" Id. at \\9 (quoting Cent. Fla. 
Invests., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3,112, 40 P.3d 599). "However, if the 
language of the contract is ambiguous such that the intentions of the parties cannot 
be determined by the plain language of the agreement, 'extrinsic evidence must be 
looked to in order to determine the intentions of the parties.'" Id. (quoting Central 
Florida, 2002 UT 3,112, 40 P.3d 599). 
A contract plagued by ambiguity, though, differs from one with 
insufficiently specific terms, as do the legal consequences in each situation. 
Hence, "the fact that the terms [of a contract] are insufficient does not make them 
ambiguous for the purpose of admitting extrinsic evidence." Warburton v. 
Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 783 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). This statement from the Warburton court reflects "the general proposition 
that a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the obligations of the 
parties are 'set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed.'" Ferris 
v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979) (quoting Overmeyer v. Brown, 439 
F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971)). This Court recently reinforced that parties to a 
contract must sufficiently specify its essential terms to make it enforceable: 
The court must be able to enforce the contract according to the parties' 
intentions; if those intentions are impenetrable, or never actually 
existed, there can be no contract to enforce. "A contract may be 
enforced even though some contract terms may be missing or left to be 
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agreed upon, but if the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no 
basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, 
there is no contract." 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 112, 78 P.3d 600 (quoting Acad. Chicago 
Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (111. 1991) (citations omitted)). The 
essential terms of a valid contract must be sufficiently definite because they 
evidence a meeting of the contracting parties' minds. "'It is fundamental that a 
meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the 
formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are 
indefinite.'" Id. at %l\ (quoting Richard Barton Enter., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 
368, 373 (Utah 1996)). 
This Court held an asserted modification invalid in Barton because, 
although the trial court "found that the parties had agreed to the 'concept' of a rent 
abatement," the amount or a method of calculating it was not supplied. Id. at 373. 
The Court explained that, "when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or a 
method for determining one, 'the agreement is too indefinite and uncertain for 
enforcement.'" Id. at 373-74 (quoting Joseph M. Perillo et ai, Corbin on 
Contracts § 4.3 at 568 (rev. ed. 1993)). 
This language from the Barton court reveals that the parties' articulation of 
methods for determining essential terms also can satisfy the requirement of 
sufficient definiteness. See also Ferris, 595 P.2d at 859 ("A contract is not fatally 
12 
defective as to price if there is an agreement as to some formula or method for 
fixing it." (footnote omitted)). In Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980), for 
example, this Court noted that language granting a right of selection to one of the 
parties did not invalidate the contract. "The fact [that] the vendee has the right to 
select the specific property subsequent to the initial agreement does not render the 
agreement uncertain or invalid." Id. at 1378 n.14. 
Under the foregoing law, because Evans's reservation fails to sufficiently 
define the essential terms of the easement's boundaries and location or to provide 
any mechanism to determine them, it should be held unenforceable. 
"[T]he law in this state is plain: A right of way founded on a deed or grant 
is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Labrum v. Rickenbach, 
711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985). Consequently, the extent of a right of way 
constitutes an essential term that the parties to a reservation must sufficiently 
define. Since the extent of a right of way is determined by its boundaries and 
location, it follows that those terms are essential as well. 
Utah decisions addressing non-deed property conveyances demonstrate that 
the boundaries and location of an easement are essential terms. In Wasatch Mines 
Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), this Court found that the 
documents in question did not convey an interest in land because they failed to 
"give a sufficient description of the property to determine the boundaries of the 
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area which the alleged grantee may enter and remove soil." Id. at 1010. The 
Court so concluded because "the documents [did] not identify the grantor, the 
grantee, the interest granted, or a description of the boundaries in a manner 
sufficient to construe the instruments as a conveyance of an interest in land." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals later relied on these four elements in its 
Warburton decision to find a purported easement invalid because it violated the 
statute of frauds. Although the court's analysis focused on the third criterion (the 
interest granted), it noted that "all four Wasatch Mines elements are important." 
Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781 n.4. The court suggested that the agreement at issue 
"was probably deficient in other elements as well," pointing out that it "probably 
did not provide an adequate boundary description because the [easement property] 
was not even in existence at the time" the agreement was made. Id. Similarly, in 
Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court of 
appeals implicitly applied three of the Wasatch Mines elements to determine that 
an alleged easement was unenforceable. The court found that the document under 
consideration did not "define with specificity the property interest claimed," nor 
did it identify the grantors or grantees. Southland, 760 P.2d at 322. After 
mentioning these deficiencies, the court observed that "[w]hen the parties leave 
material matters so obscure and undefined that the court cannot say whether the 
14 
minds of the parties met upon all the essentials or upon what substantial terms they 
agreed, the case is not one for specific performance." Id. 
In fact, the court of appeals has not limited its reliance on the four Wasatch 
Mines elements to analyses in non-deed contexts. In Kelly v. Hard Money 
Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 87 P.3d 734, the court used the four elements as 
guideposts to interpret a warranty deed. Citing the four Wasatch Mines elements 
(but quoting more recent decisions), and finding no dispute as to the grantor, the 
interest granted, or the description of boundaries, the court's analysis centered on 
whether the deed sufficiently identified the grantee. The court held that it did, and 
rejected the argument that mere misnomer of the assignee as "PCO Holdings, Inc." 
instead of "PCO Holding Company, Inc." was legally insufficient. Id. at ^21-23. 
The court of appeals did nothing new by using these elements to analyze the 
warranty deed in Kelly. For years, this Court has required parties to describe 
property conveyed by deed in sufficiently definite terms or risk having the 
conveyance voided. "It is not to be questioned that in order to be valid, the deed 
must contain a sufficiently definite description to identify the property it conveys." 
Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) (footnote omitted). See also 
Ault, 2002 UT 33,126, 44 P.3d 781 ("In Utah, a warranty deed conveys title so 
long as the deed's description of the property is 'sufficiently definite ... to identify 
the property it conveys.'" (quoting Colman, 556 P.2d at 505)); Howard v. 
15 
Howard, 367 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1962) (nullifying deed because "[e]ither it is 
impossible to determine what grantor had in mind or, conjecture indulged, one 
would have to divine that any number of areas could be said to have been 
intended"). 
The court's analysis in Potter was therefore consistent with the four 
Wasatch Mines elements. While the special warranty deed sufficiently specified 
the grantor, the grantee, and the interest granted, it failed to identify the 
easement's boundaries or location. See Potter, 1999 UT App 95, 1110-11, 977 
P.2d 533. 
Utah courts' insistence that parties supply sufficiently definite descriptions 
of property interests and boundaries to validly convey real property, whether by 
deed or otherwise, coupled with the principle that an easement's extent (i.e., its 
boundaries and location) is determined by the language of the conveying 
instrument, compel the conclusion that the boundaries and location of an easement 
are essential terms that must be sufficiently specified for the conveyance to be 
valid. 
The property description in Evans's reservation is insufficient. Although it 
specifies the easement's width (fifty-six feet) and describes it as crossing the Strip 
between Pine Street and Evans's property, the information stops there. The 
reservation provides no guidance for locating its termini, no description of its 
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length, no information on what path it follows across the 760-foot-long and 120-
foot-wide Strip, nor does it provide any method for ascertaining these terms. 
(Stmt, of Facts fl.) Without this information, the possible boundaries and 
locations of the easement are myriad. Consequently, the reservation's failure to 
sufficiently specify these essential terms nullifies it. 
Instead of applying the rules of contract construction and the Wasatch 
Mines elements it embraced at least implicitly in its prior decisions like Potter, the 
court of appeals's decision below diverged from its precedent to establish a new, 
liberalized standard for gauging the validity of easement reservations. 
The court of appeals's altered approach also carries negative consequences 
for parties to such conveyances and the state's courts. If parties to express 
easements need only identify an easement's purpose and its dominant and servient 
estates, the boundaries and locations of easements across properties much larger 
than the parcel at issue here for more unusual purposes inevitably will be left 
unstated without any indication how those terms will be decided. While prudent 
and sophisticated parties will attempt to avoid the potential for litigation by 
specifying these terms or a method for determining them, many parties will not 
exercise such foresight. Consequently, with the passage of time and its attendant 
multiplication of conveyances, waning memories, and inevitable disagreements 
over the locations and boundaries of such easements, the state's courts likely will 
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become embroiled in factually intensive disputes, exacting significant private and 
public expenditures. As with deeds, sound public policy demands the boundaries 
and locations of express easements be stated in sufficiently definite terms. Simply 
categorizing such inadequately described easements as floating or roving does not 
avoid this adverse impact. 
II. BIRD'S FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFY HIS RESERVED 
EASEMENT DOES NOT TRANSFORM IT INTO AN ACCEPTABLE 
"FLOATING" OR "ROVING" EASEMENT. 
Relying on Walker, the court of appeals stated that, "[w]hen a deed 
containing an easement grant does not fix the location of the easement, the 'grant 
constitutes a 'floating' or 'roving' easement, ....'" Evans, 2004 UT App 256 at 
117, 97 P.3d 697 (quoting Walker, 253 P.2d at 368). This notion, however, 
oversteps the traditional rules of contract construction, as explained above. 
Parties' failure to reserve an easement using sufficiently specific terms does not 
excuse them from the application of these rules. Rather, floating or roving 
easements are created when the involved parties intend to create them, just as with 
all other easements. Because it is apparent that Bird did not intend to create a 
floating or roving easement, but instead failed to describe his fixed reservation 
with sufficiently definite terms, it is void. 
Two Utah decisions address floating or roving easements in a way pertinent 
to the issues presented here: Walker and Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton 
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Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). In Flying Diamond, the agreement 
language said to be creating the floating or roving easement at issue generally 
granted easements to enter the property to prospect, extract, and transport oil and 
gas from wherever it was found. See Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 620-21. 
Similarly, in Walker the deed granted an easement for water improvements 
"'wherever'" Salt Lake City located them. See Walker, 253 P.2d at 366 (quoting 
the deed language). Thus, the language describing the easements in both of these 
cases intentionally left their boundaries and locations to be defined by other, 
future events. In other words, although the easements did not specify their 
boundaries and locations in the conveyances themselves, they did specify methods 
for determining those essential terms, which, as explained above, is sufficient. 
It is in this context that the language from Walker quoted by the court of 
appeals below must be understood. In the Walker opinion, this Court quoted the 
deed language at issue, emphasizing specific words to illustrate that the parties 
intended to locate the easement wherever the city located water conduits on the 
property. See id. at 368. The Court then explained that this kind of grant, 
meaning a grant that did not attempt to "specifically fix" the easement's location 
but nevertheless provided a method for ascertaining it, was a floating or roving 
easement that could be located by (1) agreement; (2) acquiescent use; (3) right of 
selection; or (4) necessity: 
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Such grant constitutes a 'floating' or 'roving' easement, the 
location of which may be fixed by agreement of the parties, by the 
use of a particular way by the grantee with the acquiescence of the 
grantor for a considerable period of time, or by one party in whom 
the grant vests the right of selection or the right to fix the grant, or 
where the rule of necessity determines the location because any other 
place would annul, ruin, or militate against the grant. 
Id. Both the Flying Diamond and Walker grants described one or more of these 
methods for locating the easements at issue. In Flying Diamond, "[t]he easements 
c[a]me into being as they bec[a]me 'necessary or convenient' for the activities of 
prospecting for and producing[ J oil, gas, and liquid hydrocarbons which [were] 
under the surface of the land in question ...." Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 626 
(quoting agreement language). In Walker, "the location or site of the right of way 
[was] settled, by selection of locations by the City as provided in the deed, and 
also by the long lapse (since 1906) since construction of the conduit without 
objections." Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. 
Below, the court of appeals quoted the Walker language outlining the four 
methods for locating floating easements, but, without explanation, substituted 
"[s]uch grant" with "a deed containing an easement grant [that] does not fix the 
location of the easement." Evans, 2004 UT App \\1, 97 P.3d 697. With this 
seemingly innocuous change, the court of appeals expanded the definition of 
floating or roving easements from those intentionally left to be located by methods 
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specified in the grant to now include those that parties intended, yet failed, to fix 
in the grant language. 
This Court's description of floating or roving easements in Flying Diamond 
supports the more limited definition announced in Walker. In Flying Diamond, 
this Court explained that the agreement at issue granted "a variety of what are in 
effect 'floating easements/ and those easements are subject to definition by such 
unpredictable circumstances as [(in that case)] the locations of wells, density of 
well locations, storage facilities, roads to well sites, and pipelines." Flying 
Diamond, 776 P.2d at 626 (emphasis added). This unpredictability epitomizes 
floating or roving easements, not a failure to describe fixed easements in 
sufficiently definite terms. 
Evans's reservation falls into the latter category. None of the four methods 
for locating the easements identified in Walker are present. Nor does Evans's 
reservation bear any of the indicia of the floating easements at issue in Walker and 
Flying Diamond. Its location is not subject to any unpredictable circumstances 
like where the government decides to locate an improvement or where oil deposits 
might be discovered. Rather, Evans's reservation is an insufficiently specific 
attempt to fix the location of an access easement. 
In its criticism of the trial court's reliance on Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 
(Utah 1952), to hold that it could not fix the location of Evans's easement, the 
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court of appeals appears to interpret that case as involving a floating easement. 
See Evans, 2004 UT App HI8-20, 97 P.3d 697. Evans agreed with that 
characterization in his brief opposing the County's petition for a writ of certiorari, 
grouping Wood with Flying Diamond and Walker. (Br. in Opp'n to Cert, at 4-7.) 
Wood, however, provides no guidance here for at least two reasons. 
Foremost is the fact that Wood did not involve a floating easement. 
Nowhere in that decision is the easement referred to as floating or roving. Instead, 
the deed at issue reserved "a 'right of way for road purposes across' the land 
conveyed." Wood, 253 P.2d at 353 (quoting conveyance). Although a gate had 
been constructed that the grantor and his successors used for access to the 
remaining property, they argued they had an unrestricted easement over the 
conveyed property because they had farmed it. See id. at 352-53. This Court 
disagreed, holding that "[t]he words 'for road purposes across' indicate[d] a 
restricted rather than a general reservation ..." Id. at 353. To the extent the terms 
"unrestricted" and "floating" may be interchangeable, the Wood decision actually 
confirms that Evans's easement is not floating. Like the easement in Wood, 
Evans's easement explicitly reserves an easement for a road "to provide access to 
grantor's remaining land." (Stmt, of Facts <f2.) 
The Court further held that "[t]he construction of the fence and gate 
allowing ingress and egress was a practical construction of the deed by the parties 
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and established the location of the right of way." Wood, 253 P.2d at 354. It 
reached this conclusion after observing that, "[w]here the provisions of a deed are 
doubtful the court may also look to the practical construction placed upon the 
instrument by the parties." Id. at 353. Below, the court of appeals characterized 
this reference to the parties' practical construction as "a straightforward approach 
to fixing the location of a 'floating easement'...." Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 118. 
"Under the doctrine of practical construction, when a contract is ambiguous and 
the parties place their own construction on their agreement and so perform, the 
court may consider this as persuasive evidence of what their true intention was." 
Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975). As shown here, however, 
Evans's reservation is not simply ambiguous, it is void because it lacks 
sufficiently specific essential terms. See supra, Part I. The term "floating" is not 
synonymous with "ambiguous." Accordingly, Wood's resort to the parties' 
practical construction does not mean that the reservation at issue in that case was 
floating. 
In fact, the question whether the easement existed was not at issue in Wood, 
which provides the second reason the decision is unhelpful. The issue in Wood 
was whether deed "reserved to the grantor a general and unrestricted right of 
way." Wood, 253 P.2d at 353. Consequently, the issue of whether the reservation 
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was sufficiently specific was not before the Court, and any conclusions drawn 
from the decision on that point constitute speculation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold Evans's reservation void 
for failure to sufficiently specify essential terms describing the easement's 
boundaries and location, reversing the court of appeals's decision on this point. 
This holding would obviate the court of appeals's order remanding the case to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 2004. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Barton H. Kunz II > 
Craig V. Wentz 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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THORNE, Judge: 
Hi Jamie Evans appeals from the trial court's grant of the 
Board of County Commissioners' (the Board) motion for summary 
judgment. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
1(2 In 1926, Knight Investment Company (Knight), with the 
knowledge and permission of- Utah County and Provo City, 
subdivided land it owned south of Provo. Knight divided the 
property into several lots and platted a network of roads, 
including Pine Street, which Knight then dedicated for public 
use. Knight titled the area the "Ironton Plat." At a later 
date, the R.L. Bird Company (Bird) purchased several pieces of 
property in and around the Ironton Plat. The property included: 
Several platted lots within the Ironton Plat (the Lots), a strip 
of land abutting the southeast boundary of the Ironton Plat (the 
Strip)--when used in conjunction we will address the Strip and 
the Lots as "the Property"--and an expanse of land surrounding 
the southeast corner of the Ironton Plat and connected to the 
Strip (the Corner Property). Both the Strip and the Lots abut 
Pine Street. There is a conflict as to whether the Corner 
Property abuts Pine street at its terminus. 
f3 Barring certain improvements not material to this case, 
neither Knight, nor its assigns, ever developed the Ironton Plat 
as intended. 
f4 In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interests in the Lots and the 
Strip to Utah County (the County), reserving to itself and the 
Corner Property an easement and right-of-way over the Strip and 
Pine Street. The reservation allowed Bird to access the State 
highway from the Corner Property. Specifically, the reservation 
read: 
Reserving to the grantor the public use and 
right-of-way over and into Pine Street from 
the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way 
over and across the last parcel of land 
[included in the quit claim deed (the 
Strip)], from Pine Street to connect with 
grantor's remaining property over which Utah 
County agrees to build a good gravel road 
within 90 days of the date of this 
instrument, to provide access to grantor's 
remaining land. 
15 The County accepted the deed as written and, subsequently, 
the County built a Public Works Facility upon some of the land. 
The facility currently includes a public works building, a 
service station, and a parking lot. In the course of 
construction, the County removed a large amount of earth from 
areas in and around Pine street as platted. In 1995, Bird 
conveyed its interest in the Corner Property, including its 
easement and right-of-way, to Jamie and Terry Evans (Evans). The 
easement language in the corrected deed closely tracked the 
language from Bird's 1983 quit-claim deed to the County.1 
1[6 In 1996, the County vacated several of the platted and 
dedicated Ironton Plat streets, but left Pine Street as a 
dedicated street. Evans subsequently filed suit challenging the 
1. Although Bird failed to include easement language in its 
original deed to Evans, "[a] corrective deed relates back to the 
time of the original conveyance." Arnold Indus, v. Love, 2002 UT 
133,^21, 63 P.3d 721. Consequently, because Bird filed a 
corrected deed, we read Evans's deed to the Corner Property to 
include the easement language. 
vacation order and seeking to enforce his easement.2 In July 
2002, following the cessation of settlement talks, the trial 
court entertained argument on the County's summary judgment 
motion. Although the court's order contained several dispositive 
rulings, Evans challenges only that portion dealing with his 
easement right. The court ruled that Evans's easement was 
invalid because (1) Pine Street had no physical existence or 
historical use, (2) the easement area, as described, contained no 
existing fixtures to which an easement could attach, and (3) the 
easement language was fatally vague. Evans appeals. We reverse 
and remand. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
fl7 Evans appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
"We affirm summary judgment only when 'there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law.'" Arnold Indus. v. Love, 
2002 UT 133,flll, 63 P.3d 721 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)) 
(ellipsis in original). "We grant the trial court's legal 
conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
Furthermore, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
The ultimate determination of whether an 
easement exists is a conclusion of law, which 
we review for correctness. However, the 
existence of an easement is also a highly 
fact-dependent question; therefore, we accord 
the trial judge a measure of discretion when 
applying the correct legal standard to the 
facts, and overturn a ruling concerning the 
existence of an easement only if the judge 
exceeded the discretion granted. 
Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105,flll, 37 P.3d 1112 (citation 
omitted). 
2. Evans's complaint challenged the vacation order, claimed that 
the County had deprived him of his due process rights, pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, argued that the County was in breach of 
contract, and sought a declaratory judgment recognizing his right 
to enforce the easement. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Statute of Frauds, Vagueness, and Unfixed Location 
1|8 The County argues that Bird's reservation violated the 
statute of frauds, that it was too vague to create a cognizable 
easement, and that the absence of a fixed location, under these 
circumstances, renders the reservation invalid. We address each 
assertion in turn. 
a. Statute of Frauds 
%9 Express easements involve real property interests. See 
Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). As 
such, to survive, an express easement must satisfy the statute of 
frauds. See Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "[T]he preferred way to 
transfer an interest in land and meet the requirements of the 
statute of frauds is by deed." Id. However, "' [a]11 that is 
required is that the interest be granted or declared by a writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged.1" Smith v. Osguthorpe, 
2002 UT App 361,1(24, 58 P.3d 854 (citation omitted). "Words that 
'clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, 
provided the language is certain and definite in its term[s].'" 
Warburton, 899 P.2d at 782 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 604 
P.2d 366, 368 (1979)). "While conveyances of land must contain a 
description of the land sufficient to locate it without recourse 
to oral testimony, easements need only encumber a specific 
servient estate." Benis v. Shoreridge Water Coop., 1998 Wash. 
App. LEXIS 1172, at **8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1998). 
"Besides describing the area subject to the easement, the 
conveyance granting or reserving an easement should also refer to 
its purpose." Id. at *9. However, "[t]he failure of an easement 
description to specify details, such as the exact location . . . 
does not render the easement excessively vague or unenforceable." 
Egidi v. Libertwille, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (111. App. Ct. 1993). 
Finally, when an easement arises through a deed reservation, the 
absence of the grantee's signature does not, necessarily, violate 
the statute of frauds. See Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 644 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "the covenant which ran with the 
land was not invalid for the grantee's omitted signature on the 
deed"); Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 
AND LICENSES IN LAND-EASEMENT GRANT OR RESERVATION, § 3.1 
(Thompson West 2004) ("However, in the case of the creation of an 
easement by deed reservation, the grantee's signature is not 
required."). 
|^l0 In 1983, Bird quit-claimed its interest in the Property to 
the County. However, in the quit-claim deed Bird included the 
following language: 
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Reserving to the grantor [Bird] the public 
use and right-of way over and into Pine 
Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide 
right-of-way over and across the last parcel 
of land [the Strip], from Pine Street to 
connect with the grantor's remaining 
property. 
Thus, Bird transferred its interest in the Property, and reserved 
an easement or an exception through the deed. The deed noted 
both the dominant and the servient estate, established the 
purpose of the easement or exception,3 and clearly indicated 
Bird's intent to reserve an easement when it conveyed the 
property. Moreover, the County accepted and recorded Bird's 
quit-claim deed as written; consequently, the County is "charged 
with knowledge of its contents," and cannot now claim ignorance 
or lack of agreement. Chase, 507 N.E.2d at 644. Accordingly, 
Bird's easement, which was transferred to Evans, does not violate 
the statute of frauds, and to the extent that the trial court 
concluded that it did, we reverse its conclusion.4 
3. "When an easement has been in existence for many years at the 
time it is mentioned in the deed, it is an exception, not a 
reservation." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements & Licences § 19 n.94 
(citing Barrett v. Kunz, 604 A.2d 1278, 1281 (Vt. 1992)). Bird's 
interest in Pine Street, if any, arose some years before Bird 
conveyed its interest to the County. There is no question that 
Bird did not own Pine Street, it being a street platted for 
public use. However, because Bird may have acquired its property 
interest with reference to the plat map, it may have acquired a 
right-of-way over Pine Street, which it could then reserve. 
Thus, Bird's interest in Pine Street is properly characterized as 
an exception, rather than a reservation. See 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements & Licenses § 19 ("Since an exception in a conveyance 
operates *co exclude from the terms cf the granting clause some 
right or interest which would otherwise pass to the grantee, 
strictly speaking, an easement cannot be created by exception; 
nevertheless, an easement may be created by an exception of 
an existing way . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); cf. Barrett, 604 
A.2d at 1281 ("Because the easement had been in existence for 
many years at the time it was specifically mentioned in the 
deed . . . , it was an 'exception,' rather than a reservation 
. . . . ") . 
4. Although the trial court mentioned the statute of frauds in 
its findings and conclusions, it did not expressly find that 
Bird's reservation violated the statute of frauds. Rather, the 
court focused its analysis on its determination that the easement 
was invalid due to vagueness. 
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b. Vagueness 
llll The County, relying on Potter v. Chadez, 1999 UT App 95, 977 
P.2d 533, argues that the language Bird utilized in its deed to 
the County is fatal to Evans's present easement claim. We 
disagree. 
1|l2 The trial court concluded that the reservation as a whole 
was void because the reservation language was vague, the easement 
location was not fixed by the deed, and no fixtures existed from 
which the court could fix the easement location. "A right of way 
founded on a deed or grant is limited to the uses and extent 
fixed by the instrument." Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 
227 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). "It is also established in 
this state that a deed should be construed so as to effectuate 
the intentions of and desires of the parties, as manifested by 
the language made use of in the deed." Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 
580, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (1952).5 "Further, when [a] deed creates 
an easement the circumstances attending the transaction, the 
situation of the parties, and the object to be attained are also 
to be considered." Id.; see also Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 
791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) ("The paramount rule of 
construction of deeds is to give effect to the intent of the 
parties as expressed in the deed as a whole."). The deed "must 
contain a description of the land that is to be subjected to the 
easement with sufficient clarity to locate it with reasonable 
certainty. However, it is not necessary to designate with 
definiteness the part of the land to which the right attaches." 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 18 (1996) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Hall v. Allen, 771 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1989) 
5. It is also widely accepted that "'an express easement . . . 
requires "mutual assent by the parties manifesting their 
intention to be bound by its terms."1" Potter v. Chadez, 1999 UT 
App 95,119, 977 P. 2d 533 (alterations in original) (quoting Green 
v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (additional 
citations omitted)). In this case, the County's decision to 
accept and record the quit claim deed signaled its intention to 
be bound by the agreement. See Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 
644 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (stating "the covenant which ran with 
the land was not invalid for the grantee's omitted signature on 
the deed"); John W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., THE LAW OF 
EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND-EASEMENT GRANT OR RESERVATION, 
§ 3.1 (Thompson West 2004) ("However, in the case of the creation 
of an easement by deed reservation, the grantee's signature is 
not required."); see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses 
§ 18 (1996) ("Acceptance by the grantee of a deed conveying an 
easement in express terms brings the easement into existence 
without any further act on the part of the grantee showing his 
acceptance of the easement itself."). 
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omitted); see also Hall v. Allen, 771 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1989) 
(en banc) ("An easement may be created even though its precise 
location is not described in the grant."); Mitchell v. Chance, 
2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218, at *13 (Term. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2004) 
("Even though drafters of express easements should prepare a 
legal description of both the servient tenement and the precise 
portion of the servient tenement over which the easement runs, 
deeds or other instruments failing to indicate an easement's 
location or dimensions are commonplace. However, these sorts of 
omissions and oversights are not necessarily fatal to the 
easement." (citations omitted)). "When a deed creating an 
easement explicitly refers to an existing road, the courts 
commonly construe the location and dimensions of the intended 
easement to conform with the location and dimensions of the 
road." Mitchell, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218, at **15-16. 
1|l3 Here, Bird conveyed the Property to the County, but 
specifically reserved a fifty-six-foot right-of-way over the 
Strip, as well as a private easement over Pine Street. The 
purpose of the easement was clear: Bird intended to preserve its 
preexisting access between the Corner Property and the state 
highway. Both the Strip and Pine Street are clearly identified, 
either in the plat map or within the deed. "By accepting the 
deed, [the County is] charged with knowledge of its contents. If 
the easement was unsatisfactory, [the County] was free to refuse 
the deed." Chase v. Nelson, 507 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1987) . Thus, when the County accepted the deed, it accepted the 
terms and the easement was brought into existence. Potter does 
not alter this outcome. 
^14 In Potter, after examining language which purported to 
create an easement for a "stranger to the deed," we concluded 
that "the language in the deed [was] not sufficiently detailed 
[because the] vague language [did] not constitute a definite and 
ascertainable description of the property." Potter, 1999 UT App 
95 at HKll-12. Admittedly, there are factual similarities 
between Potter and the instant case. However, we conclude that 
the deed language in this case is sufficiently detailed to create 
an enforceable easement. 
Hl5 From the language in the deed we are able to discern that 
the Strip is the servient estate, the Corner Property is the 
dominant estate, and the purpose of the easement is to allow the 
holder of the Corner Property to move between the Corner Property 
and the nearby state highway. To this end, the parties agreed to 
establish a fifty-six-foot wide roadway over the Strip, which 
would allow Bird, or its assigns, to cross from the Corner 
Property and onto Pine Street. Pine Street would then be used as 
the transport portal to reach the highway. In light of this 
clear and detailed language, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in determining that the language in the deed was vague and 
therefore fatal to Evans!s easement. 
c. Fixing the Easement's Location 
Hl6 The trial court also found that the easement failed "because 
there exists no physical improvement, fixture, or use of Pine 
Street" that could be used to fix the location of the easement. 
Because the location of Pine Street is platted and the plat 
contains the metes and bounds defining the area that comprises 
Pine Street, we presume that the trial court's focus was on the 
absence of fixtures or improvements that could be used to fix the 
location of the easement over the Strip. 
1)17 When a deed containing an easement grant does not fix the 
location of the easement, the 
grant constitutes a "floating" or "roving" 
easement, the location of which may be fixed 
by agreement of the parties, by the 
[acquiescent] use of a particular way . . . 
for a considerable period of time, or by one 
party in whom the grant vests the right of 
selection or the right to fix the grant, or 
where the rule of necessity determines the 
location because any other place would annul, 
ruin or militate against the grant. 
Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 123 Utah 1, 253 P.2d 365, 
368 (1953). 
118 Relying on Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351 (1952), 
and Walker, the trial court concluded that it could not 
"reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the 
easement by virtue of existing features." This does not 
accurately reflect either the requirements of the law or the 
holdings of Ashby or Walker. In Wood, the court: was faced with 
determining the location amd purpose of an easement that had been 
granted through a deed. See Wood, 2 53 P.2d at 3 52. The deed, as 
conveyed, reserved to the "grantors a right of way for road 
purposes." Id. However, as time passed, the grantor's 
successors in interest asserted a "general and unrestricted right 
of way" over the property." Id. at 353. The court's analysis 
began by noting that deeds should be construed "so as to 
effectuate the intentions and desires of the parties." Id. at 
353. The court further established that, to make this 
determination properly, trial courts must examine "the 
circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the 
parties, and the object to be attained." Id. Then, the court 
identified what may be best described as a straightforward 
a 
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approach to fixing the location of a "floating easement," 
stating: "Where the provisions of a deed are doubtful the court 
may also look to the practical construction placed upon the 
instrument by the parties." Id. 
Kl9 Applying this standard, the Wood court examined the facts of 
the case. See id. at 353-54. The court noted that the easement 
was established "to obtain a way in and out of the . . . 
property." Id. The court then determined that the transaction 
created an easement, and not a fee simple interest, and that 
under the circumstances a practical construction of the easement 
terms was the most efficient means to determine the easement *s 
location. See id. Consequently, after describing an existing 
fence and gate that bounded the servient estate, which had 
traditionally defined the ingress and egress path used by the 
holder of the easement, the court concluded that the gate 
described the location of the right-of-way. See id. at 353-54. 
Thus, the court utilized the parties' historical practical 
construction of the easement to fix its location; it did not, 
however, establish a rule requiring reliance on such a 
construction. 
120 Wood does not mandate the invalidation of an otherwise valid 
"floating" easement in the absence of fixtures, improvements, or 
historical use. The court's use of the word "may" in its 
analysis reflects its reliance on "practical construction" and 
suggests that the trial court is granted discretion to consider 
such factors, but that considering such factors is certainly not 
required. Cf. State v. Mclntvre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879, 881 
(1937) (concluding that the use of the word "may" "indicates a 
grant of power and not a limitation"); Crockett v. Crockett, 836 
P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("According to its ordinary 
construction the word "may" means permissive, and it should 
receive that interpretation . . . . " ) . 
i|21 Similarly, in Walker, the court was asked to determine the 
extent and location of a deed granted right-of-way, which did 
"not specifically fix the [easement's] location []or width." 
Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. The court, after noting that such a 
grant constitutes "a 'floating' or 'roving1 easement," concluded 
that "the location or site of the right of way is settled, by 
selection of locations by the City as provided in the deed, and 
also by the long lapse (since 1906) since construction of the 
conduit without objections." Id. Consequently, the location of 
the easement was not central to the case. However, prior to 
drawing that conclusion, the court articulated several methods 
that can be used to fix the location of a "floating" easement, 
including historical usage and practical construction. See id. 
Moreover, although the Walker court relied on a practical 
construction, nothing in the opinion suggests that any one of the 
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outlined acceptable methods is preferable, and three of the 
acceptable methods--agreement of the parties, the rule of 
necessity, and the right of selection--require no reliance on 
past use or improvements to fix the easement location. 
|22 In the instant case, the deed does not fix the location of 
the right-of-way over the Strip. The language in the deed, 
however, does clearly identify the dominant and servient estates, 
the width of the right-of-way, and its purpose. Consequently, 
Evans's easement is a valid "floating" or "roving" easement, "the 
location of which may be fixed" by the trial court utilizing any 
one of the factors articulated by the Walker court. See id. 
II. The Propriety of Bird's Reservation and Exception6 
H23 Evans argues that the trial court erred in concluding that 
Bird could not reserve a right-of-way over Pine Street when Bird 
conveyed its interests in the Property to the County. "'Since it 
is manifest that a grantee may receive only what a grantor has to 
give, [Evans's] rights are based upon a construction of the 
original . . . deed.'" Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 
1982) (quoting Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 353 
(1952)) (ellipsis in original). "Under our law, a landowner 
whose property abuts a public road possesses, by operation of 
law, a private easement of access to that property across the 
public road." Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted); see also Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 
126 P. 959, 962 (1912) (stating "the abutting landowner, besides 
his right as one of the public, may acquire a right to private 
easements, even if he never owned the fee of the soil in the 
highway"). Moreover, 
[i]t is manifest to all that, where property 
is sold by a vendor and purchased by a vendee 
with reference to a map or plat which shows 
that such propei~ty abuts upon a public 
highway, such maip or plat may amount to and 
may be considered as an implied covenant by 
the vendor that the highway is what it 
purports to be, and that it will not be 
obstructed or interfered with by him. A 
vendee may also assume (and such assumption 
is supported by law) that the other abutting 
6. There seems to be no question that Bird possessed the right 
to attempt to reserve an easement over the Strip when it was 
conveyed to the County. Consequently, our analysis is restricted 
to Bird's attempt to reserve or exclude a right-of-way over Pine 
Street. 
10 
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owners may not obstruct the highway so as to 
prevent him from passing along any portion of 
the highway to and from his property which 
abuts thereon. 
Tuttle, 126 P. at 963; see Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105,1112, 
37 P.3d 1112 ("Under Utah law, landowners whose property abuts 
public streets, alleys, and public ways that appear on a plat map 
are entitled to a private easement over those public ways."); see 
also Filios v. Oak Ridge Forest Corp., 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
2972, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1999) ("It is well settled 
that when reference to a map is made in the deed which conveys a 
lot and that map delineates roadways, even though there is no 
express easement granted, in certain circumstances the lot owners 
acquire the right to have the streets and highways thereafter 
kept open for use in connection with their lands. . . . This is 
so even if at the time of the lot transfer the delineated 
roadways are not developed." (alterations in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted)); Campbell v. Brock, 159 S.E.2d 
409, 411 (Ga. 1968) ("'When . . . the owner of a tract or 
boundary of land divides it into lots, streets, and alleys, 
causes a map or plat of the same to be made and duly recorded 
whereby the lots, streets, and alleys are delineated, and sells 
the lots with reference thereto, the purchasers acquire private 
property rights to the streets and alleys of the subdivision.'" 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Newinaton 
Plantation Estates Ass'n v. Newington Plantation Estates, 4 58 
S.E.2d 36, 38 (S.C. 1995) ("Absent evidence of the seller's 
intent to the contrary, a conveyance of land that references a 
map depicting streets conveys to the purchaser, as a matter of 
law, a private easement by implication with respect to those 
streets, whether or not there is a dedication to public use."). 
However, if the street, or streets, at issue were legally vacated 
prior to the property being purchased and the easement arising, 
the purchaser will not have a private easement right. See 
Carrier, 2001 UT 105 at Ul5. 
f^24 The County argues that Carrier also requires chat the street 
exist as an improved feature of the area. We disagree. Although 
it is true that the alley at issue in Carrier had been, to a 
certain degree, improved, and had been "open for public use for 
over a hundred years," neither condition was central to the 
decision. Id. Instead, the court focused its analysis on 
whether the alley at issue had been vacated before the plaintiffs 
purchased their property. See id. ("Because the alley had not 
been legally vacated at the time of plaintiffs' purchase, the 
trial court was correct in finding that plaintiffs' reliance on 
the plat map entitles them to private easements over the alley 
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abutting their properties as depicted on the plat map.").7 
Consequently, instead of adding a threshold element to this 
analysis, Carrier merely reaffirms the longstanding doctrine that 
a private easement over platted streets arises upon the purchase 
of property with reference to the plat map, so long as the roads 
have not been legally vacated prior to the purchase. Cf. Hall v. 
North Oaden City, 109 Utah 304, 166 P.2d 221, 224 (rejecting as 
unsound " [t]he argument that streets could not properly be 
located on the plat of a townsite unless the street was already 
in use"), judgment set aside on other grounds on rehearing, 109 
Utah 325, 175 P.2d 703 (1946). 
125 In the instant case, Pine Street was platted, dedicated, and 
recorded, on a plat map in 1926. To date, Pine Street remains a 
dedicated street. Bird purchased several lots within the plat 
that abut Pine street. However, from the record before this 
court, it is impossible to determine when the purchase was made 
or if Bird acquired the property with specific reference to the 
plat map. Thus, we cannot determine whether or not Bird acquired 
a private easement over Pine Street at the time of the purchase,8 
and are therefore in no position to determine the validity of 
Evans's claim. Moreover, the trial court occupied an equally 
unsuitable position in making its determination that Bird had no 
right to reserve or except an easement over Pine Street when it 
conveyed the Property to the County. Bird's power to reserve or 
except the use of Pine Street does not turn simply on the 
historic use of Pine Street, but instead on certain facts not 
7. The language upon which the County bases its argument is 
merely the Carrier court's attempt to distinguish the Carrier 
facts from those presented in Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 
126 P. 959, 962 (1912) . See Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 
105,1114-15, 37 P.3d 1112. 
8. Evans does not present a separate argument that Pine Street, 
following its dedication, became a public highway over which 
Bird, as an abutting landowner, would have had an ingress and 
egress easement. See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 
1993) ("Under our law, a landowner whose property abuts a public 
road possesses by operation of law, a private easement of access 
to that property across the public road."). Thus, we express no 
opinion on this issue except to note that whether or not Pine 
Street existed as a public highway depends on the law in 
existence at the time of its platting. See Mailory v. Taggart, 
24 Utah 2d 267, 470 P.2d 254, 256 (1970) (stating "[w]hatever may 
be the law now regarding ownership of dedicated streets, the law 
in force and effect when the land in the instant matter was 
subdivided and platted" is controlling). 
A12 
presently in the record. Thus, we conclude that the trial court 
erred in granting the County summary judgment on this ground. 
CONCLUSION 
1(26 We reverse the trial court's determination that Evans's 
easement is invalid. The language in the deed conveying the 
Property to the County satisfies the requirements of the statute 
of frauds, and is sufficiently detailed to survive the County's 
vagueness challenge. The easement reserved by Bird is a 
"floating" or "roving" easement, the location of which may be 
fixed through means outlined in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. 
Walker, 123 Utah 1, 253 P.2d 365 (1953). Finally, when a 
purchaser of property acquires its interest with reference to a 
plat map upon which streets have been platted, the purchaser 
concomitantly acquires a private easement over the streets that 
cannot thereafter be unreasonably restricted. 
K27 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that 
Evans's easement was invalid as a matter of law, and we remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
> * 
William A. Thome Jr 
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Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMIE EVANS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF UTAH COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960400821 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on 
May 14, 2002. Samuel D. McVey appeared for the Plaintiff and Craig V. Wentz appeared for the 
Defendant. Upon reviewing the Motion and memoranda filed by the parties, hearing the 
arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, 
enters the following Order and Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows: 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns real property known as the Ironton Plat and 
Ordinance 1996-20 affecting such plat which the Board of Utah County Commissioners adopted. 
Ordinance 1996-20 vacated certain streets of the plat and Plaintiffs purported ownership of a 
private right-of-way over the property. In February 1926, Knight Investment Company recorded 
the Ironton Plat and dedicated for public use Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Walnut, Naples, Dupont 
and Pine streets. In 1935 Utah County and the Colorado Development Company conveyed land 
each owned near or within the Ironton Plat to the State of Utah to be included in the development 
of the newly aligned Highway 89 between Provo City to the north and Springville City to the 
south. Subsequently, On July 9, 1983, the R.L. Bird Company delivered a quit claim deed to 
Utah County that conveyed lots it owned within the Ironton Plat to accommodate the County's 
construction of a public works building and a strip of land on the south boundary of the plat. 
This quit claim deed contained a reservation which is the subject of Defendant's Motion that 
states: 
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and into Pine 
Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way over and across the 
last described parcel of land, from Pine Street to connect with grantor's remaining 
property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel road within 90 
days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to grantor's remaining land. 
On November 27, 1995, R.L. Bird Company conveyed another portion of its property 
located to the south and east of the Ironton Plat to Jamie Evans and Terry Evans (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff). In January 1986, the County completed the construction of a public works facility 
2 
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that included a building, a service station, and a parking lot within the Ironton Plat. During 
construction a substantial amount of material was removed from the hillside located on the west 
end of the Pine Street right-of-way. On October 29, 1996, the Board of Utah County 
Commissioners (hereinafter "Defendant") adopted Ordinance 1996-20 (hereinafter "UCO 1996-
20"), that vacated the platted Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets. The vacating ordinance UCO 
1996-20 as adopted did not vacate platted Yale and Pine Streets or Columbia Avenue. 
Seeking to challenge the vacating ordinance Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on 
February 7, 1997. Defendant filed its Answer on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, on November 21, 
2001, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment to which Plaintiff filed his Opposition 
on April 2, 2002, and which was followed by Defendant's Reply on May 8, 2002. Subsequently, 
the Court heard oral argument on the Motion on May 14, 2002 and took the Motion under 
advisement. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a judgment shall be rendered 
upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Defendant asserts that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiffs causes of action are barred under the law. By 
its Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the ordinance; and 
notwithstanding a lack of standing, the ordinance is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under 
U.C.A. 17-27-1001; that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because there is no violation of Plaintiff s 
right to due process; that Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is barred by the statute of 
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limitations; that Plaintiffs reservation of aright-a-way is void; that Plaintiff failed to file a notice 
of claim with the County; and Plaintiffs request for Declaratory Judgment is a redundant cause 
of action. Plaintiff denies that Defendant's assertions are a valid bar of his causes of action, but 
concedes that his third cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs wife Mrs. Terry Evans must be added to 
the lawsuit because the quit-claim deeds of 1995 and 2001 both contain her name, and, therefore, 
she is an indispensable party. As communicated at oral argument, the Court notes that Mrs. 
Evans' name does appear on the deeds, and as such the Court would grant Plaintiffs request for 
leave to join her as a Plaintiff. Her joinder therefore is not material for the outcome of this 
Ruling. 
The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiffs claim requesting the Court declare Utah 
County Ordinance 1996-20 void pursuant to Utah Code § 17-27-1001, as an arbitrary and 
capricious action. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this claim under 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1001. Plaintiff, however, contends that his action can be brought under either 
under UCA § 17-27-1001 or U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 which does not require standing to enforce a 
claim. U.C.A. § 17-27-1001, states in part: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land use decisions made 
under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this chapter 
until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in exercise of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the 
district court within 30 days after the local decision is rendered. . . . 
(3) (a) The Court shall: 
(i) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
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(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal, 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision 
violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law. 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002, states in pertinent part: 
(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate within the county in 
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this 
chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies provided by 
law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, 
use, or act . . . . 
Plaintiff asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 only requires a person own property within the 
county. Further, Plaintiff contends that he also has standing to satisfy section 1001 because his 
property abuts the subject Naples, Dupont and Pine streets. Defendant, however, asserts that 
Plaintiffs arguments fail because he initially brought his action under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 not 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002; that he is challenging the County's land use decision rather than seeking to 
enforce provisions of the Land Use Act or the ordinance that the County enacted under its 
authority; and he has failed to allege facts that would trigger the application of U.C.A. § 17-27-
1002. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between section 1001 and section 1002 
Section 1001 applies only when a party desires to challenge a land use decision. 
Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions made under the Land Use Act, but 
instead seek enforcement of decisions made pursuant to it.... Enforcement of the 
act and ordinances made pursuant to it is addressed in 1002.... 
s 
Culbertson v Board o,fCounty Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
2001). 
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of the presented 
authorities the Court concludes that Plaintiffs claim is contained within section 1001. The Court 
notes, however, Plaintiff fails to maintain a claim under section 1002 because he fails to assert 
that Defendant violated UCO 1996-20 and fails to seek a remedy of enforcement against 
Defendant to follow its adoption of UCO 1996-20 as required under section 1002. Therefore, as 
the case authorities suggest, if Plaintiff challenges a land use decision under section 1001, he is 
required to have standing to challenge the ordinance. 
Plaintiff asserts that he has standing because he owns property that abuts the platted 
Naples and Dupont streets through Columbia Avenue. Defendant contends, however, that 
Plaintiff lacks standing because his property fails to actually and legally abut the vacated streets 
of Naples and Dupont. Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court of Utah requires abutting 
properties to obtain standing by stating, "Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge a street 
vacation because their lots did not abut the vacated streets." Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359, 
1362. Plaintiff contends his property abuts Naples and Dupont streets because each street 
intersects Columbia Avenue on its west side and such streets continue through Columbia to abut 
his property on the east side. Defendant disagrees with this argument and asserts that Columbia 
Avenue is a collector street that serves the function to accept traffic from the access streets of 
Dupont and Naples and distribute the traffic into the street circulation system. The Court is 
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persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of Defendant's authorities the Court 
concludes that Dupont and Naples streets merely connect into Columbia Avenue. The streets of 
Dupont and Naples end at Columbia Avenue and do not cross through Columbia to abut 
Plaintiffs property. Plaintiffs property, therefore, fails to abut any vacated street within the 
Ironton Plat, and, as such, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge UCO 1996-20. 
Notwithstanding a lack of standing, for purposes of making a record decision of each of 
the issues the Court will next examine whether UCO 1996-20 is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
The parties are in disagreement of whether UCO 1996-20's vacation of Walnut, Naples and 
Dupont streets was a legislative or administrative act. Both parties agree that if the vacation of 
streets is a legislative act then it would be viewed deferentially by the courts under the reasonable 
debatable standard. However, it is Plaintiffs assertion that the act of vacation is administrative 
in nature; and, therefore, should be reviewed utilizing substantial evidence to support the 
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the case authorities 
cited by Defendant are not unanimous; that the case of Bradley v Pay son City Corp., 17 P.3d 
1160 (Utah Ct. App. 2001,), regarding the existence of a difference in standards of review for 
legislative and administrative acts, has been granted writ of certiorari of review by the Utah 
Supreme Court; and the County Enabling Act designates plat vacation as a administrative act. 
The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs first and second arguments. While the Court recognizes 
there is a split of opinion of the appellate decision, it must nonetheless accept the authority for its 
present application to the case. 
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The Court will next examine the Defendant's authorities to determine whether the 
vacating of an ordinance is a legislative or administrative act. Defendant asserts that the 
Supreme Court of Utah states that "the authority to vacate streets, when exercised in the general 
public interest, is a legislative power vested in municipal corporations." Sears v. Ogden City, 
572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). Plaintiff; however, asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-808 and 810 
implicate that plat vacation is an administrative function that post-dates the Sears case 
invalidating its authority. The Court concludes that § 808 and § 810 do not invalidate the Sears 
case. The facts of the present case indicate that the Utah County Board of County 
Commissioners, a legislative body, vacated the streets by legislative act, adopting UCO 1996-20. 
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument that § 17-27-810 codifies the requirements that 
are part of a legislative decision. U.C.A. § 17-27-810(l)(b) states, 
If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither the public nor any person 
will be materially injured by the proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and 
that there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or amendment, the legislative 
body, by ordinance, may vacate, alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, 
or any street or lot. 
The Court notes the statute specifically states "the legislative body" and "by ordinance." The 
statutory characterization of the body communicates that an ordinance vacating a plat is the 
product of legislative action. Such action is a legislative action as further interpreted in Harmon 
City, Inc, wherein the court stated, 'The legislative process is inherently political in nature and 
requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interest of all concerned in furtherance of the 
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general welfare." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d. 321 (Utah 2000). The Harmon 
City case also states "it is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy,... and an 
administrative body's job to enforce the policy." The Utah Court of Appeals concludes that "the 
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act." Id. Further, 
the Court of Appeals has stated, "unlike administrative proceedings which turn almost 
exclusively on evidence presented, zoning decisions require municipalities to weigh competing 
interests and conflicting concerns to arrive at a decision that serves the general welfare." Bradley 
v. Pay son City Corp., 17 P.2d. 1160 (Utah 2001). 
After review of these authorities, the Court concludes that the vacation of streets in UCO 
1996-20 is fundamentally a legislative act; and, therefore, is to be reviewed using the reasonably 
debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal analysis of U.C.A. § 
17-27-1001. As to the "reasonably debatable standard," the Court notes that the Utah Court of 
Appeals has stated, "So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general 
welfare ...the court will uphold the ... zoning decision." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 
P.2d 321 (Utah 2000). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was present at the Utah County 
hearing held on October 29, 1996. Plaintiff voiced his concern over the proposed street vacation 
because of his claim to an applicable reservation over Pine Street and Columbia Avenue, and as 
such, the Commissioners, uncertain about Plaintiffs contention, determined to exclude Pine 
Street and Columbia Avenue. The vacated streets were only dedicated streets. There existed no 
physical nor historical general public use of any of the dedicated streets. The Court concludes 
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that the public possessed no interest in the streets. The Utah County Commissioners also finding 
that there was no public interest in the streets, concluded that it was beneficial to vacate the 
streets. The Court concludes that there exists sufficient basis in the record to support the Board 
of Utah County Commissioners, adopting of UCO 1996-20 with its vacating of Walnut, Naples, 
and Dupont streets. As such, the Court does not find that the Utah County Commissioner's 
action was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Next, the Court examines Plaintiffs claim of violation of his right of due process. 
Plaintiff asserts that his procedural and substantive rights of due process to access his property 
have been violated with Defendant's adoption of UCO 1996-20. Plaintiff argues that his 
property interests have been diminished with the vacated Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets 
because he owns a reserved right-of-way conveyed to him by the R.L. Bird Company that 
undeterminably runs over Pine Street to his property. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant's 
actions have created questions of fact and violate its general police power. Defendant counters 
however, that Plaintiffs argument impermissibly expands the scope of his claim. The Court 
notes that Plaintiffs claim is based solely on UCO 1996-20, and also that the vacating ordinance 
did not include Pine Street and Columbia Avenue. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's 
arguments. Plaintiff has based his § 1983 claim upon UCO 1996-20. The UCO 1996-20 vacated 
Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets but did not include Columbia Avenue and Pine Street, for 
reasons previously stated. The Court concludes that while Plaintiff challenges UCO 1996-20, it 
did not include Pine Street, and as such, Plaintiffs alleged reservation is irrelevant to this claim. 
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Further, the Court has previously discussed the issue of Plaintiff s property allegedly abutting 
Naples and Dupont Streets across Columbia Avenue and determined that Plaintiffs property 
does not abut those streets. The Court also notes that Plaintiff cites a United States Supreme 
Court decision which states, "land use ordinances that do not substantially advance a legitimate 
public interest constitutes a denial of due process." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 
U.S. 687 (1998). Further, Plaintiff asserts that in not paying for its actions, Defendant has 
surpassed the scope of its police powers. However, after review of Plaintiff s authorities, the 
Court concludes that the cited cases refer to separate and distinct land use "takings" that Plaintiff 
has not raised in his Complaint and Plaintiff cannot raise new claims or theories of recovery 
through his Memorandum in Opposition. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate that UCO 1996-20 had no rational relationship to Defendant's legitimate police 
power objectives. Plaintiff cannot identify a protectible property interest or controvert 
Defendant's evidence that it complied with the procedural requirements for passing UCO 
1996-20. Plaintiffs claims for due process fail and there exists no issue of material fact 
regarding the § 1983 claim. 
Next, the Court will examine the validity of the Plaintiffs alleged easement reservation. 
Plaintiff asserts that the reservation deeded to him by the R.L. Bird Company in 1995 is a valid 
easement and one that may be precisely fixed by the Court. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs 
reservation is void because Pine Street was not physically established as a public road; because 
the Court is without authority to fix the location of the easement without physical markings and 
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use; and because the description of the reservation is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. 
Citing the Supreme Court of Utah, "it is manifest," however, "that a grantee may receive only 
what the grantor has to give" Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952); Defendant argues that 
R.L. Bird Company did not have a private easement in Pine Street and could not reserve or 
convey what it did not own. Plaintiff counters that R.L. Bird Company originally owned all of 
the adjacent property and owned the easement rights over Pine Street as an abutting property 
owner when it reserved the right-of-way in 1983. It is undisputed by the parties that presently 
Pine Street remains only a dedicated plat street. However, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
established that private easements over public ways are created only when those public ways 
physically existed at the time the landowner acquired the property. Carrier v. Lindquist, 37 P.3d 
1112 (Utah 2001). Defendant's additional authorities support this establishment; and, therefore, 
Pine Street though it exists on paper as a dedicated street, it has no physical existence or 
historical use. Plaintiff, therefore, does not own a private easement over a public right-of-way. 
Regardless of the public/private distinction discussed above, there is the added problem 
in this case of determining the actual location of the alleged, reserved easement. Plaintiff 
contends that the Court possesses the authority to fix the location of the easement. Defendant 
asserts that Plaintiff misinterprets the case authorities because in each cited case there was some 
physical improvement or fixture from which the easement could be associated. While the Court 
is persuaded by Plaintiffs authorities which suggest the Court is generally empowered to 
designate an easement location in some instances, the Court concludes that these authorities are 
12 A26 
distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Wood v Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), 
the parties constructed a fence and gate allowing use of the property between the servient and 
dominant parcels. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded in that case, that because there was an 
existing fence and gate, the trial court was adequately assisted to reasonably locate the easement 
consistent with an existing physical improvement. Id. Further, in Salt Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. 
Walker Inc., 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), the location of the right-of-way was fixed because there 
existed a conduit to transport water and the only question remaining for the court was to decide 
the appropriate width of the easement. Having reviewed the parties' authorities, the Court 
concludes that this case is distinguishable because there exists no physical improvement, fixture, 
or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago. 
Therefore, the Court is unable to discern from the deed a location for an easement and cannot 
reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the easement by virtue of existing 
fixtures. 
Defendant also asserts that beyond the lack of specificity of the place of fixation for the 
easement, the reservation as a whole is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. Defendant 
cites the cases of Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P. 2d 533 (Utah 1999), and Southland Corp. v. Potter, 
760 P.2d 320 (Utah 1988), in which the trial courts determined that the documents the parties 
relied upon to reserve a right-of-way failed to establish the existence of an agreement needed to 
create an express easement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reliance upon these authorities is 
misfounded because each contained a stranger to the deed requiring the courts to ultimately 
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decide the cases. Defendant asserts however, that while the cases discussed the issue of a 
stranger to the deed, the courts nonetheless determined that the reservations were void because of 
vagueness. The Court has reviewed Defendant's authorities and finds the argument persuasive. 
Each case analyzes the issue of a possible express reservation and concludes that there was no 
such reservation because of vagueness. In each case the stranger to the deed issue was treated 
separately and distinctly in the discussion. 
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim for his 
breach of contract cause of action and his declaratory judgment claim is redundant. Defendant 
asserts that Plaintiff must file a notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff asserts that his previous counsel filed the notice of claim three months after he filed his 
Amended Complaint. Defendant contends that, "No suit against the state may be maintained if 
notice is not given." Madsen v. Bortnick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); and as such, Plaintiffs 
filing the notice of claim three months after his filing of the Amended Complaint is untimely and 
fails to provide proper notice. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. The Court 
concludes that notice given after the Complaint or Amended Complaint is untimely, and, 
therefore, the cause of action may not be maintained because of a lack of notice of a claim 
against Utah County. Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff conceded his breach of contract 
claim as untimely under the statute of limitations. Therefore, Plaintiff only has the remaining 
prayer for relief for $50,000 in damages in regard to his § 1983 due process claim. The Court 
has previously discussed Plaintiffs § 1983 claim and it is to be dismissed. Plaintiff also raises a 
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new claim for inverse condemnation in his Memorandum in Opposition and not in his Amended 
Complaint. The Court however, has previously concluded Plaintiffs new claim for inverse 
condemnation as improperly pled; and, therefore, is to be dismissed. Further, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for declaratory judgment requesting the Court 
declare his first four claims valid is redundant and as such, it is to be dismissed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this 
decision, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determines 
that there exists no issue of material fact; and, therefore, respectfully dismisses all of Plaintiff s 
claims for relief. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and 
Plaintiffs suit is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this 3 1 day of July, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
IS/ FRED D. HOWARD 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Utah Fourth District Court, Utah County 
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The above-entitled matter having come before the court on the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and the court having reviewed the Motion and Opposition; and the court being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now makes the following ruling: 
BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns real property known as the Ironton Plat and 
Ordinance 1996-20 affecting such plat which the Board of Utah County Commissioners adopted. 
Ordinance 1996-20 vacated certain streets of the plat and Plaintiffs purported ownership of a 
private right-of-way over the property. In February 1926, Knight Investment Company recorded 
the Ironton Plat and dedicated for public use Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Walnut, Naples, Dupont 
and Pine streets. In 1935 Utah County and the Colorado Development Company conveyed land 
each owned near or within the Ironton Plat to the State of Utah to be included in the development 
of the newly aligned Highway 89 between Provo City to the north and Springville City to the 
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south. Subsequently, On July 9, 1983, the RX. Bird Company delivered a quit claim deed to 
Utah County that conveyed lots it owned within the Ironton Plat to accommodate the County's 
construction of a public works buildiag and a strip of land on the south boundary of the plat. This 
quit claim deed contained a reservation which is the subject of Plaintiffs Motion that states: 
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and 
into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56* wide right-of-way 
over and across the last described parcel of land, from Pine Street 
to connect with grantor's remaining property over which Utah County 
agrees to build a good gravel road within 90 days of the date of this 
instrument, to provide access to grantor's remaining land. 
On November 27, 1995, R.L. Bird Company conveyed another portion of its property 
located to the south and east of the Ironton Plat to Jamie Evans and Terry Evans (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff"). In January 1986, the County completed the construction of a public works facility 
that included a building, a service station, and a parking lot within the Ironton Plat. During 
construction a substantial amount of material was removed from the hillside located on the west 
end of the Pine Street right-of-way. On October 29, 1996, the Board of Utah County 
Commissioners (hereinafter "Defendant") adopted Ordinance 1996-20 (hereinafter "UCO 1996-
20"), that vacated the platted Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets. The vacating ordinance UCO 
1996-20 as adopted did not vacate platted Yale and Pine Streets or Columbia Avenue. 
Seeking to challenge the vacating ordinance Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on 
February 7, 1997. Defendant filed its Answer on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, on November 21, 
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2001, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment to which Plaintiff filed his Opposition on 
April 2, 2002, and which was followed by Defendant's Reply on May 8, 2002. Subsequently, the 
Court heard oral argument on the Motion on May 14, 2002 and took the Motion under 
advisement. 
ANALYSIS 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "a judgment shall be rendered 
upon a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact/' Defendant asserts that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiffs causes of action are barred under the law. By its 
Motion Defendant asserts that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the ordinance; and 
notwithstanding a lack of standing, the ordinance is not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under 
U.C.A. 17-27-1001; that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim fails because there is no violation of Plaintiff s 
right to due process; that Plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action is barred by the statute of 
limitations; that Plaintiffs reservation of a right-a-way is void; that Plaintiff failed to file a notice 
of claim with the County; and Plaintiffs request for Declaratory Judgment is a redundant cause of 
action. Plaintiff denies that Defendant's assertions are a valid bar of his causes of action, but 
concedes that his third cause of action for breach of contract is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Further, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs wife Mrs. Terry Evans must be added to the 
lawsuit because the quit-claim deeds of 1995 and 2001 both contain her name, and, therefore, she 
is an indispensable party. As communicated at oral argument, the Court notes that Mrs. Evans' 
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name does appear on the deeds, and ais such the Court would grant Plaintiflf s request for leave to 
join her as a Plaintiflf. Her joinder therefore is not material for the outcome of this Ruling. 
The Court begins its analysis with Plaintiflf* s claim requesting the Court declare Utah 
County Ordinance 1996-20 void pursuant to Utah Code § 17-27-1001, as an arbitrary and 
capricious action. Defendant asserts that Plaintiflf lacks standing to bring this claim under U.C.A. 
§ 17-27-1001. Plaintiflf, however, contends that his action can be brought under either under 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 or U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 which does not require standing to enforce a 
claim. U.C.A. § 17-27-1001, states in part: 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a county's land 
use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation 
made under authority of this chapter until that person has 
exhausted all administrative remedies. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in 
exercise of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for 
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days 
after the local decision is rendered.... 
(3) (a) The Court shall: 
(I) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, 
(b) A determination of illegality requires a determination 
that the decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law. 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002, states in pertinent part: 
(1) (a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real estate 
within the county in which violations of this chapter or 
ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter occur 
or are about to occur may, in addition to other remedies 
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provided by law, institute: 
(I) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other 
appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove 
the unlawful building, use, or act 
Plaintiff asserts that U.C.A. § 17-27-1002 only requires a person own property within the 
county. Further, Plaintiff contends that he also has standing to satisfy section 1001 because his 
property abuts the subject Naples, Dupont and Pine streets. Defendant, however, asserts that 
Plaintiffs arguments fail because he initially brought his action under U.C.A. § 17-27-1001 not 
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002; that he is challenging the county's land use decision rather than seeking to 
enforce provisions of the Land Use Act or the ordinance that the county enacted under its 
authority; and he has failed to allege facts that would trigger the application of U.C.A. § 17-27-
1002. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between section 1001 and section 1002 
as: 
Section 1001 applies only when a party desires to challenge 
a land use decision. Plaintiffs do not challenge any decisions 
made under the Land Use Act, but instead seek enforcement 
of decisions made pursuant to it... Enforcement of the act 
and ordinances made pursuant to it is addressed in 1002... 
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3 (Utah 2001). 
The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of the presented 
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authorities the Court concludes that Plaintiffs claim is contained within section 1001. The Court 
notes, however, Plaintiff fails to maintain a claim under section 1002 because he fails to assert that 
Defendant violated UCO 1996-20 and fails to seek a remedy of enforcement against Defendant to 
follow its adoption of UCO 1996-20 as required under section 1002. Therefore, as the case 
authorities suggest, if Plaintiff challenges a land use decision under section 1001, he is required to 
have standing to challenge the ordinance. 
Plaintiff asserts that he has standing because he owns property that abuts the platted 
Naples and Dupont streets through Columbia Avenue. Defendant contends, however, that 
Plaintiff lacks standing because his property fails to actually and legally abut the vacated streets of 
Naples and Dupont. Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court of Utah requires abutting 
properties to obtain standing by stating, "Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge a street vacation 
because their lots did not abut the vacated streets." Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362. 
Plaintiff contends his property abuts Naples and Dupont streets because each street intersects 
Columbia Avenue on its west side and such streets continue through Columbia to abut his 
property on the east side. Defendant disagrees with this argument and asserts that Columbia 
Avenue is a collector street that serves the function to accept traffic from the access streets of 
Dupont and Naples and distribute the traffic into the street circulation system. The Court is 
persuaded by Defendant's argument. After review of Defendant's authorities the Court concludes 
that Dupont and Naples streets merely connect into Columbia Avenue. The streets of Dupont and 
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Naples end at Columbia Avenue and do not cross through Columbia to abut Plaintiffs property. 
Plaintiffs property, therefore, fails to abut any vacated street within the Ironton Plat, and, as such, 
Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge UCO 1996-20. 
Notwithstanding a lack of standing, for purposes of making a record decision of each of 
the issues the Court will next examine whether UCO 1996-20 is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
The parties are in disagreement of whether UCO 1996-20fs vacation of Walnut, Naples and 
Dupont streets was a legislative or administrative act. Both parties agree that if the vacation of 
streets is a legislative act then it would be viewed deferentially by the courts under the reasonable 
debatable standard. However, it is Plaintiffs assertion that the act of vacation is administrative in 
nature; and, therefore, should be reviewed utilizing substantial evidence to support the arbitrary, 
capricious and illegal standard. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the case authorities cited by 
Defendant are not unanimous; that the case of Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 17 P.3d 1160 (Utah 
Ct App. 2001), regarding the existence of a difference in standards of review for legislative and 
administrative acts, has been granted writ ofcertiori of review by the Utah Supreme Court; and 
the County Enabling Act designates plat vacation as a administrative act. The Court is 
unpersuaded by Plaintiffs first and second arguments. While the Court recognizes there is a split 
of opinion of the appellate decision, it must nonetheless accept the authority for its present 
application to the case. 
The Court will next examine the Defendant's authorities to determine whether the 
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vacating of an vacation ordinance is a legislative or administrative act. Defendant asserts that the 
Supreme Court of Utah states that "the authority to vacate streets, when exercised in the general 
public interest, is a legislative power vested in municipal corporations." Sears v. Ogden City, 572 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). Plaintiff; however, asserts that UCA § 17-27-808 and 810 implicate that 
plat vacation is an administrative function that post-dates the Sears case invalidating its authority. 
The Court concludes that § 808 and § 810 do not invalidate the Sears case. The facts of the 
present case indicate that the Utah County Board of County Commissioners, a legislative body, 
vacated the streets by legislative act, adopting UCO 1996-20. The Court is persuaded by 
Defendant's argument that § 17-27-810 codifies the requirements that are part of a legislative 
decision. UCA § 17-27-810 (l)(b) states, 
If the responsible body or officer is satisfied that neither 
the public nor any person will be materially injured by the 
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment, and that 
there is good cause for the vacation, alteration, or 
amendment, the legislative body, by ordinance, may vacate, 
alter, or amend the plat, any portion of the plat, or any street or lot. 
The Court notes the statute specifically states "the legislative body" and "by ordinance." The 
statutory characterization of the body communicates that an ordinance vacating a plat is the 
product of legislative action. Such action is a legislative action as further interpreted in Harmon 
City, Inc., wherein Plaintiff stated, "The legislative process is inherently political in nature and 
requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interest of all concerned in furtherance of the 
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general welfare." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P2d. 321 (Utah 2000). The Harmon 
City case also states "it is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy,... and an 
administrative body's job to enforce the policy." The Utah Court of Appeals concludes that "the 
enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act." Id. Further, 
the Court of Appeals has stated, "unlike administrative proceedings which turn almost exclusively 
on evidence presented, zoning decisions require municipalities to weigh competing interests and 
conflicting concerns to arrive at a decision that serves the general welfare." Bradley v. Payson 
City Corp., 17 P3d. 1160 (Utah 2001). 
After review of these authorities, the Court concludes that the vacation of streets in UCO 
1996-20 is fundamentally a legislative act; and, therefore, is to be reviewed using the reasonably 
debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal analysis of UCA §17-27-1001. 
As to the "reasonably debatable standard," the Court notes that the Utah Court of Appeals has 
stated, "So long as it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare... the 
court will uphold the...zoning decision." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 997 P.2d 321 (Utah 
2000). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was present at the Utah County hearing held on 
October 29, 1996. Plaintiff* voiced his concern over the proposed street vacation because of his 
claim to an applicable reservation over Pine Street and Columbia Avenue, and as such, the 
Commissioners, uncertain about Plaintiff's contention, determined to exclude Pine Street and 
Columbia Avenue. The vacated streets were only dedicated streets. There existed no physical 
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nor historical general public use of any of the dedicated streets. The Court concludes that the 
public possessed no interest in the streets. The Utah County Commissioners also finding that 
there was no public interest in the streets, concluded that it was beneficial to vacate the streets. 
The Court concludes that there exists sufficient basis in the record to support the Board of Utah 
County Commissioners, adopting of UCO 1996-20 with its vacating of Walnut, Naples, and 
Dupont streets. As such, the Court does not find that the Utah County Commissioner's action 
was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
Next, the Court examines Plaintiffs claim of violation of his right of due process. Plaintiff 
asserts that his procedural and substantive rights of due process to access his property have been 
violated with Defendant's adoption of UCO 1996-20. Plaintiff argues that his property interests 
have been diminished with the vacated Walnut, Naples and Dupont streets because he owns a 
reserved right-of-way conveyed to him by the R.L. Bird Company that undeterminably runs over 
Pine Street to his property. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant's actions have created 
questions of fact and violate its general police power. Defendant counters however, that 
Plaintiffs argument impermissibly expands the scope of his claim. The Court notes that Plaintiffs 
claim is based solely on UCO 1996-20, and also that the vacating ordinance did not include Pine 
Street and Columbia Avenue. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's arguments. Plaintiff has 
based his § 1983 claim upon UCO 1996-20. The UCO 1996-20 vacated Walnut, Naples and 
Dupont streets but did not include Columbia Avenue and Pine Street, for reasons previously 
10 
A39 
stated. The Court concludes that while Plaintiff challenges UCO 1996-20, it did not include Pine 
Street, as such, Plaintiffs alleged reservation is irrelevant to this claim. Further, the Court has 
previously discussed the issue of Plaintiff s property allegedly abutting Naples and Dupont Streets 
across Columbia Avenue and determined that Plaintiffs property does not abut those streets. The 
Court also notes that Plaintiff cites a United States Supreme Court decision which states, "land 
use ordinances that do not substantially advance a legitimate public interest constitutes a denial of 
due process." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1998). Further, Plaintiff 
asserts that in not paying for its actions, Defendant has surpassed the scope of its police powers. 
However, after review of Plaintiff s authorities, the Court concludes that the cited cases refer to 
separate and distinct land use "takings" that Plaintiff has not raised in his Complaint and Plaintiff 
cannot raise new claims or theories of recovery through his Memorandum in Opposition. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that UCO 1996-20 had no 
rational relationship to Defendant's legitimate police power objectives. Plaintiff cannot identify a 
protectible property interest or controvert Defendant's evidence that it complied with the 
procedural requirements for passing UCO 1996-20. Plaintiffs claims for due process fail and 
there exists no issue of material fact regarding the § 1983 claim. 
Next, the Court will examine the validity of the Plaintiffs alleged easement reservation. 
Plaintiff asserts that the reservation deeded to him by the R.L. Bird Company in 1995 is a valid 
easement and one that may be precisely fixed by the Court. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs 
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reservation is void because Pine Street was not physically established as a public road; because the 
Court is without authority to fix the location of the easement without physical markings and use; 
and because the description of the reservation is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. 
Citing the Supreme Court of Utah, "It is manifest," however, "that a grantee may receive only 
what the grantor has to give" Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952); Defendant argues that 
RX. Bird Company did not have a private easement in Pine Street and could not reserve or 
convey what it did not own. Plaintiff counters that RX. Bird Company originally owned all of the 
adjacent property and owned the easement rights over Pine Street as an abutting property owner 
when it reserved the right-of-way in 1983. It is undisputed by the parties that presently Pine 
Street remains only a dedicated plat street. However, the Supreme Court of Utah has established 
that private easements over public ways are created only when those public ways physically 
existed at the time the landowner acquired the property. Carrier v. Lindquist, 37P .3d l l l2 
(Utah 2001). Defendant's additional authorities support this establishment; and, therefore, Pine 
Street though it exists on paper as a dedicated street, it has no physical existence or historical use. 
Plaintiff, therefore, does not own a private easement over a public right-of-way. 
Regardless of the public/private distinction discussed above, there is the added problem in 
this case of determining the actual location of the alleged, reserved easement. Plaintiff contends 
that the Court possesses the authority to fix the location of the easement. Defendant asserts that 
Plaintiff misinterprets the case authorities because in each cited case there was some physical 
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improvement or fixture from which the easement could be associated. While the Court is 
persuaded by PlaintiflPs authorities which suggest the Court is generally empowered to designate 
an easement location in some instances, the Court, concludes that these authorities are 
distinguishable from the instant case. In the case of Woodv. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), 
the parties constructed a fence and gate allowing use of the property between the servient and 
dominant parcels. The Supreme Court of Utah concluded in that case, that because there was an 
existing fence and gate, the trial court was adequately assisted to reasonably locate the easement 
consistent with an existing physical improvement. Id. Further, in Salt Lake City v. J.B. &RE. 
Walker Inc., 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), the location of the right-of-way was fixed because there 
existed a conduit to transport water and the only question remaining for the court was to decide 
the appropriate width of the easement. Having reviewed the parties' authorities, the Court 
concludes that this case is distinguishable because there exists no physical improvement, fixture, 
or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago. 
Therefore, the Court is unable to discern from the deed a location for an easement and cannot 
reasonably discern a proper place to fix the location of the easement by virtue of existing fixtures 
Defendant also asserts that beyond the lack of specificity of the place of fixation for the 
easement, the reservation as a whole is vague and violative of the statute of frauds. Defendant 
cites the cases of Potter v. Chadaz, 977 P.2d 533 (Utah 1999), and Southland Corp. v. Potter, 
760 P.2d 320 (Utah 1988), which the trial courts determined that the documents the parties relied 
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upon to reserve a right-of-way failed to establish the existence of an agreement needed to create 
an express easement. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reliance upon these authorities is 
misfounded because each contained a stranger to the deed requiring the courts to ultimately 
decide the cases. Defendant asserts however, that while the cases discussed the issue of a 
stranger to the deed, the courts nonetheless determined that the reservations were void because of 
vagueness. The Court has reviewed Defendant's authorities and finds the argument persuasive. 
Each case analyzes the issue of a possible express reservation and concludes that there was no 
such reservation because of vagueness. In each case the stranger to the deed issue was treated 
separately and distinctly in the discussion. 
Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim for his breach 
of contract cause of action and his declaratory judgment claim is redundant. Defendant asserts 
that Plaintiff must file a notice of claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity's Act. Plaintiff 
asserts that his previous counsel filed the notice of claim three months after he filed his Amended 
Complaint. Defendant contends that, "No suit against the state may be maintained if notice is not 
given." Madsen v. Bortnick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); and as such, Plaintiffs filing the notice of 
claim three months after his filing of the Amended Complaint is untimely and fails to provide 
proper notice. The Court is persuaded by Defendant's argument. The Court concludes that notice 
given after the Complaint or Amended Complaint is untimely, and, therefore, the cause of action 
may not be maintained because of a lack of notice of a claim against Utah County. Further, the 
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Court notes that Plaintiff conceded his breach of contract claim as untimely under the statute of 
limitations. Therefore, Plaintiff only has the remaining prayer for relief for $50,000 in damages in 
regard to his § 1983 due process claim. The Court has previously discussed Plaintiff's § 1983 
claim and is to be dismissed. Plaintiff also raises a new claim for inverse condemnation in his 
Memorandum in Opposition and not in his Amended Complaint. The Court however, has 
previously concluded Plaintiffs new claim for inverse condemnation as improperly pled; and, 
therefore, is to be dismissed. Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action 
for declaratory judgment requesting the Court declare his first four claims valid is redundant and 
as such, it is to be dismissed. 
For the forgoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the pleadings supportive of this 
decision, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court determines 
that there exists no issue of material fact; and, therefore, respectfully dismisses all of Plaintiffs 
claims for relief Defendant's counsel is directed to submit an Order to the Court consistent with 
this Decision. 
DATED this / f ^ d a v of July, 2002. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing ruling were mail, postage prepaid, on the I day of 
July 2002 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit: 
Craig W. Wentz 
Barton H. Kunz II 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, PC. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Samuel D. McVey 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0210 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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jUtah County Enginp j^r 
jUtah County Builc 
^uy^i 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
*»5." 
R. L. BIRD COMPANY, a corporation organized a-d existing under the laws 
of the State of Utah with its principal office at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to UTAH COUNTY, State of 
Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration, the following tracts of land in Utah County, State of Utah ; 
All of lots 13, 14, 17, and IS in Block 6 of the Ironton Subdivision 
Plat A. 
loft*'
 A11 of lotg n ^ 12, 19, 20 and 21 and the fractional parts of lots 
13, Iky 15, 16, 17, and 18 belonging to the grantor in Block 7 of the Ironton 
Subdivision Plat A. 
ALSO; Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Ironton Subdivision 
/^gflat A, which point is at the east end of the south line of Pine Street, 
running thence South 32 Deg. 52. Min East 120 feet; thence South 57 Deg. 
08 Min, West 760 feet to State Highway; thence North 32 Deg. 52 Min. West 
along said highway 120 feet to South line of Pine Street; thence North 
57 Deg. 08 Min. East 760 feet to point of beginning. 
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and 
into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide right-of-way 
over and across the last described parcel of land, from Pine Street to 
connect with the grantor's remaining property over which Utah County agrees 
to build a good gravel road within 90 days of the date of this in-strumeh^, 
to provide access to grantor's remaining land. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the 
i| transfer represented thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly 
{| adopted by the board of directors of the grantor at a lawful meeting duly 
ij held and attended by a quorum. 
| In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and 
I seal to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers this ?J?L day 
, of July A.D. 1983. 
Attest: 
,tl ^< 
Secretary 
R. L. BIRD COMPANY 
By «Oa-x-<rcA^ . -a. iu*x 
% V' ^ T A T E OF UTAH 
„_ President 
7- > °P 
Vfeota^ty of Salt Lake ) 
On the ?— day of July, A.D. 1983 personally appeared before me 
Dorothy B. Hart and M. A. Bird who being by me duly sworn did say, each 
for himself, that she the said Dorothy B. Hart is the president,and he. 
the said M. >„ Bird is the secretary of the R. L. Bird Company, and that 
the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation 
• by authorijty of a resolution of its board of directors and said Dorothy B. 
Hart and M. A. Bird each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation 
1
 executed the same and t hat the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
•P, D lMjrCcommision expires October 28, 1985 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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SURVtTOR S CERTIFICATE 
r hereby c e r t i f y tb»t th« t r * e t of Ian* »hewn on U i i s nap 
and owned by the KnigKt Tvteaimcnt Ct h » j been •urveyrd by me 
an* that the boundaries t h e r o f are Aeaerlbe* a t f e l l e w * 
> 
Thence 
Thenee 
Thence 
TTlirjcc 
Thence 
Tbenee 
iS -it* 
a 37° 
S 32* 
H 57 8 
S 32» 
S 57* 
N 16* 
N 32* 
« 36* 
N 60* 
N 30* 
K a s * 
52 
06 
52 
06 
52 
08 
36 
52 
24 
6? 
02 
26 
F. 
W 
X 
E 
E 
W 
W 
W 
W 
E 
K 
1112 0 
120 0 
660 0 
ieo o 
300 0 
0S6 29 
345 76 
930 0 
749 43 
16 IS 
5*4 32 
393 94 
Tt 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
Vt 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
Ft 
OltHERS DEDICATION 
Knew a l l m«tn by th so present s tftat the kNtGHT IKVEST 
KENT COMPANY a corpora t ion owner or th« above d e s c r i b e d land 
havtof caused the sa»»« to be subdivided i n t o BlocKs Lota S t r e e t s 
and Ar«nuea t o be h e r e a f t e r Kntr«n aa 1R0HTON S u b d U i a i o n Acme 
Hereby d e d i c a t e for the ptrwitual yaa of tho Publ ic a l l parce l* 
o f land d e s i g n a t e d In the Surveyor 3 C e r t i f i c a t e and shewn on 
t h t a map a« intended f o r Publ ic u s e s 
IN WlTUrSS WHEBEOr the »nid MIGHT INVESTMENT COMPAWT 
haa boreunto caused i t s cor w r o t e naine t o b e s i gned and H a c o r -
p o r a t e s e a l t o be a f f i x e d , ind the 30*c t o be a t t e s t e d by the 
s i g n a t u r e of j m Knight i t s **ice P r e s i d e n t and P. K Al len 
i t s Secra iary en t b i s i & d a . or XarcO A D 1923 T h i s a s r e e 
went 13 executed by anid coitpany and by s a i d o f f i c e r s by v i r t u e 
of & r e s o l u t i o n duly passed by I t ] d i r e c t o r s en the a U day or 
Waecft A D 1023 
The BH1CHT INVESTMENT COMPANY 
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OUNTJ^-^RVCYOH 
Araa at ««3 Acres 
t e point of T»e»innin« 
itsseereta^ ^ 3 
ACKHOWUEDCE»E?r BEFORE «0TAfTf PU8HC 
That I have b j the a u t h o r i t y of sa id owners thereof aub 
d i v i d e d the same i n t o b l o c k s l o t a s t r e e t s and avenue* to bo 
known a s IHDMTOW S u b d i v i s i o n t h a t the aa»« ha* been c o r r e c t l y 
surveyed end e s t a b l i s h e d on the ground by the p lac ing ef iron 
y i n s irte f e e t l ong by 5 / a Inches in d l a n t t e r at the block corners 
HAWE3 AND D1MEJI310HS OF FARCEW OF 1A*ID PE31CWATED FOP. PUBLIC U3E 
COLUMBIA AVE«UE 80 f t wide la 2372 f t long KENWOOD ST 1 6 f t wide 
15 520 f t long HAWARt> ST 60 f t wide IS 615 f t long YALE ST 
60 rt wide la 666 Tt long HUHCETOH ST 60 f t wide ia 560 f t long 
WALNUT ST 60 f t wide ia 560 f t long WAPLS5 ST 60 f t wide ia 560 
f t lotiar DOPOMT 3T 60 f t wide 13 560 f t long PIH£ 3T 6 0 f t 
16 B50 f t long 
4iS3i~ ., 
da 
County of Utah 
0r> tho iJ» day o f Ma 
b e f o r e me 3 Vm Knight whi 
he i s t.he Vice P r e s i d e n t of 
o r a t i o n o r g a n i s e d and e x i a t 
t h a t s a i d Inatrunent was a n 
the a u t h o r i t y of a r e s o l u t i . 
on t h e *«• day of March A D 
sc tnowledged t o n e that s a l 
ch A D 1923 p e r s o n a U y appeared 
beirij by m%. duly a*orn d i d say that 
t h e Knight i m c a t i a e n t CanpatV a eorp 
ng under the lawa of the s t a t e of Utah 
ncd in b e h a l f o f s a i d corporat ion by 
1 o f i t s board o f d i r e c t o r s , enacted 
19Z3 and the sa id J Km Knight 
corpora t ion executed t h i s inetrunent 
Hy c wlssior expin XX^f-^x /c%. ) 
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